Generally, it is supposed that the presence of institutional investors may lead to the change in company's behavior. The purpose of this study is to study the relationship between information asymmetry and ownership concentration with profit management in 119 listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. The period of study is from 2006 to 2011. At the first hypothesis of the study, it is predicted that there is a significant relationship between ownership concentration and information asymmetry. Results represent a significant relation between this variable with information asymmetric. In other words, with increasing of ownership concentration during the study period, information asymmetry in the sample companies increased. During the second hypothesis, it is predicted that there is a significant relationship between profit management and information asymmetry and ownership concentration. Results confirm the second hypothesis. According to the achieved results, it is recommended to investors and analysts to pay attention to factors such as combination of ownership and information asymmetry of companies along with the figures given by the companies and capital market for short-term and long term investment decisions.
Major and institutional shareholders as an observer: According to Roe (1990) , in a combination of widespread ownership, any of shareholders have little incentive to monitor om company's management, because in this case every person who wants to monitor, he should pay the relevant costs, this happened while the other shareholders also use its profits, So, the extent and nature of the agency issue depends on the combination of ownership directly. Many authors including Sholeifer & Vishny (1986) Admati, et al (1993) , Huddart (1993) Maug (1998) and Noe (2002) believe that the inclusion of major shareholders in the monitoring and control activities cause the limit of the agency issue potentially. The impact of ownership concentration on share prices: with regard to institutional investors as professional shareholders, Walther (1997) proceed to the forecasts of the profit which expected to pay and the results of their researches show that the present people in the market are professional shareholders in the forecast of the profit of those companies who have institutional shareholders, they mainly focus on the forecast of analysts rather than time series models. Information asymmetry and market efficiency: information asymmetry is generated when the shareholders do not access to confidential information which are available for company's managers. The existence of adequate information in market and reflection of information in a rapid and timely manner on the price of securities has a close relationship with market efficiency. Profit management: profit management is generally applied to showing partial views of company's management in transposition of income and cost accounting records or taking into account the expense or transfer them to later years so that it makes the company has a procedure of profits without major changes during some fiscal years. This paper discusses about the leveling methods on one hand and on the other hand it deals with the other works such as qualitative characteristics of information and more disclosure which makes the managers is not successful in the leveling processes. Managers' motivation for oriented reporting: motivated managers ' motivation for untrue reporting can be associated with three variables used in the economic literature. These three variables are company size, income taxes, and debt contracts. In addition to the three variables mentioned, two other variables that can be managers' motivation, including profit variability, and deviation of the operational activities. 
Demsezolin 1985
The study of concentrated ownership There is not significant relation between the concentrated ownership and accounting profit.
Short 1994
The study of profitability's measure at companies which are under the control of the owners.
The companies which are under the control of owners have higher productivity than the companies under the control of the managers.
Forth et.al 2002
The study of relationship between controlling mechanisms in guidance of companies and company 's performance
There is a significant relation between the controlling mechanisms in guidance of companies and company's performance.
Libya Matthew Vorab 2003
The study of active companies at Toronto Exchange Before the declaration of profit, the domain of bid price of shares' purchase and sale has been increased.
Lui Chiovil 2004
The study of active companies at Euronext Paris Exchange
The extent domain of bid price of shares' purchase and sale can be observed before its announcement.
Chambers 2005
The study of stability forecast of accruals and cash flows
Investors make an effort to predict the stability of accruals and cash flows but they are not able to reflect them in the prices. The study of the relationship between time asymmetry of the profit and ratio of market value to book value of shares.
There is a negative significant relationship between the time asymmetry of the profit and ratio of market value to book value of shares. ( MTB )
Reza Zadeh and Azad in 2008
The study of the relationship between information asymmetry and conservatism in financial reporting
There is a positive and significant relationship between information asymmetry among investors and applied conservatism level in financial reporting.
Samayee 2003
The study of the relationship between the leveling of profit and adjusted returns based on risk
In confidence level, 90% of the companies that do leveling profit have higher abnormal returns averagely.
Qaemi et al 2003
The study of the effect of profit leveling on the stock returns of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange
There is no significant difference between leveling companies and non leveling companies in the terms of unusual returns.
Ibrahimi Kordlor and Hassani Azar Dariani 2006
The study of profit management at the time of initial offering of shares to the public in accepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange
Managers manage the companies' profits in the year before initial offer and within the first offering year of shares to public.
Research hypotheses
The first main hypothesis: 1 -There is a significant relationship between ownership concentration and information asymmetry.
The second main hypotheses:
2 -There is a significant relationship between profit management and information asymmetry and ownership concentration.
Research Methodology:
This research discusses about the study of relationships between variables, and it is based on historical data after the confirmation of existence this relationship in the current situation. So, it can be classified as post-event. The type of present study is correlation and based on regression equations. From the type of classification of researches based on goal, this research is in the group of applied researches. In this study, it has been used listed companies on the Stock Exchange Tehran stock to collect data of research hypotheses. It is discussed about the test, analysis and results interpretation of research hypothesis for decision making after the extraction of required data through software Tadbir LGDEBTit + ε DACit = α 0 + α 1 DINSit+ α 2 ABSit + α 3 ABSit*DINSit + α 4 MTB+ α 5 Size+ α 6 Lev+ α 7 Beta+ α 8 LGDEBTit + ε 2 -Definition of the Variables: Profit management: TACC 4 The method of variables measurement: The method of measurement of dependent variable 1 is as follows: The Method of measuring of profit management (dependent variable) It has been used of discretionary accruals as an indicator of profit management. These items will be calculated by the regression residual of whole accruals on sales of property and equipment (independent variables). It will be used of model Dechow, P et al (1995) 
) + ε
In the above equation: TACC: The Sum of Accruals (net operating profit after tax -cash flow from operating activities) ΔREV: Change in annual sales PPE: the net value of property, machinery and equipment , − : Book value of total assets ε: The remaining of regression In the above model the regression residuals (ε) is accruals (DisAccr) which is used as reporting quality index (research independent variable) in hypothesis testing. Whatever this value is higher, the accruals quality is lesser. The method of calculation of the independent variable 1 is as follows: Method of measuring information asymmetry (dependent variable) To Measure the information asymmetry between investors and managers, we have used the model that Venkatesh p. C & R Chiang (1986) designed for determine the domain of bid price of order and sale of shares. This model has been used in several studies. The Qaemi and LGDEBT it The method of calculation of the independent variable 4 is as follows: Natural logarithm of company's assets (Company's size) of Company I in year t: Size it The method of calculation of the independent variable 5 is as follows: Common stock book value / market value of the common stock = M / B The method of calculation of the independent variable 6 is as follows:
The ratio of debt to assets (financial leverage) of company I in year t: Levit The method of calculation of the independent variable 7 is as follows: Measure of systematic risk of the company I in year t: Beta it Description of Findings In this part of the research findings, the studied companies' performance in a random sample is described based on fundamental statistical indicators. In table 4-2, a summary of the findings description are listed: Table 2 Table 2 , the average of these figures is zero. This finding verifies one of the regression assumptions base on being zero of average of errors and their being normal. Descriptive analysis related to the controlling variables of research indicates that statistical sample companies are equal on the average in terms of the amount and volume of assets and liabilities, because the standard deviations of both variables are low. The average of the variables in the ratio of market value to book value is far from its maximum value. These finding indicates that in all these companies have limited growth opportunities. The obtained average of financial leverage indicates that approximately 45.9% of the capital structure of the statistical sample companies is debt. Descriptive statistics of Variable Beta shows that the statistical sample companies are varied in terms of systemic risk, because the range of this variable is expanded. The result of the statistical analysis shows that the, the determination coefficient of the first model is the amount of 0.108 and this model could explain 10.8% of the changes of dependant variables through independent variable. Watson camera statistic is from 1.5 to 2, so there is no correlation between the errors of the regression model. Based on the results, determination coefficient regression model has significantly increased by entering the controlling variables and it reached to the rate of 0.309. So 30.9% information asymmetry of the statistical sample companies has been due to the concentration of ownership and controlling variables used in the regression model during the period of study. The results show that in the first model of test of the first hypothesis, the estimated coefficient for the variable of ownership concentration level is the amount of 0.261 and significance level of 0.026 shows a direct and significant relationship between this variable with information asymmetry level. This finding is consistent with the theoretical basis of research and presented claims in the first the hypothesis. In other words, information asymmetry in the statistical sample companies has been increased by increasing the concentration of ownership during the period of study. In the second model of the first hypotheses test, log variables liabilities, size of company, growth opportunities, financial leverage and systematic risk have been added to the regression model as controlling variables. Results of statistical analysis for the coefficients of independent and controlling variables in the second model of first hypothesis test showed a direct and significant relationship between ownership concentration and information asymmetry. As it is listed in the table above, coefficient of INS variable is 0.271 which has increased a little compared to the previous model. Results show that the relationship between the variables of debt and growth opportunities with the logarithm of level of information asymmetry is reversed and relationship of financial leverage with this variable is positive and significant. Based on the obtained results, the variables of company size and risk do not have a significant effect on information asymmetry, because the level of significance of these variables id over 0.05. So, these variables can be deleted from the hypothesis model. Two latest column of the above table show the result related to linear tests between the independent variables. The lack linear is the other classic regression hypothesis and it is criteria for model validity. The values of linear statistics for all independent variables are close to 1 which indicates the lack of strict linear among the independent variables. Based on the achieved results of the first hypothesis, no convincing evidence found for the acceptance of the hypothesis H0. In other words, at a confidence level of 95%, it can be claimed that there is a significant relationship between ownership concentration and information asymmetry. Consequently, the first hypothesis of this study is accepted at this level of confidence. The results of the second hypothesis: Regarding the achieved significant level of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which is higher than the test error level (05/0 = α), the hypothesis H0 of test can be accepted. Therefore, the value related to discretionary accruals variables follows a distribution close to a normal distribution. the second hypothesis test, no convincing evidence has been achieved to accept the hypothesis H0. In other words, at confidence level of 95%, it can be claimed that there is a significant relationship between profit management and the information asymmetry and ownership concentration. Consequently, the second hypothesis of this research is accepted at this confidence level. LGDEBTit + ε
Conclusions:
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between information asymmetry and profit management ownership concentration in listed companies at Tehran Stock Exchange. It was used 119 active companies in information at Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2007 2012 on the study, for analysis of data, it was used regression model of data panel with fixed effects method, in this respect, and ownership structure has been examined in the term of ownership concentration. This means that if the major shares of company are in the hand of special individuals does it lead to information asymmetry. The findings achieved of the research results explains that by increasing of ownership concentration during the period of study, information asymmetry increases in the statistical sample companies, in the second hypothesis of this study, we also sought to investigate whether ownership concentration in companies with asymmetric information environment makes profit management or not? The results of the regression model assumptions indicate a significant positive relationship between information asymmetry and profit management. In fact, the companies which have asymmetric information environment have been more willingness to manipulate the profit through discretionary accruals. The achieved results of research hypothesis towards the fulfilment of mentioned goals are as follows:
The Analysis of the results achieved from the first hypothesis The results of the first hypothesis showed that at statistical sample companies under study, the level of information asymmetry is elevated by increasing concentration of ownership. The above finding indicates the role of major shareholders in the information environment of companies. This role, depending on the motivation and ability of shareholders can be positive or negative. According to the study of Chidambaran, & John (2000), the large institutional investors can acquire confidential information through companies' managers and transfer them to the other shareholders. But, for accepting this monitoring it is required that large investors maintain their shareholders for relatively long time in order to have enough shares to adjust Free-rider problem of the other shareholders from this monitoring.
Analysis of the results of the second hypothesis
The second hypothesis test results showed that the relationship between information asymmetry and profit management in companies with high ownership concentration are 
